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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
SEABORNE-WORSLEY V. MINTIENS: IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE MODERN AUTOMOBILE, THE DOCTRINE OF 
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE HAS BECOME LARGELY 
OBSOLETE  
By: Chelsea King 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the doctrine of imputed 
negligence no longer presumes the owner-passenger of a vehicle has 
operational control over a permissive driver, and therefore, may not be 
responsible for the negligence of a permissive driver.  Seaborne-Worsley v. 
Mintiens, 458 Md. 555, 576, 183 A.3d 141, 153 (2018).  The court also held 
that a negligent third-party may not use the contributory negligence of a 
permissive driver as a defense against an innocent owner-passenger of the 
vehicle.  Seaborne-Worsley, 458 Md. at 576, 183 A.3d at 153.  Therefore, the 
doctrine of imputed negligence would not bar an owner-passenger’s ability to 
recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident in which the owner-
passenger was not at fault.  Id.
     On October 23, 2015, Victoria Worsley’s (“Ms. Worsley”) husband drove 
the couple in a vehicle that Ms. Worsley individually owned.  Mr. Worsley 
had parked the vehicle in the travel lane of a restaurant parking lot, 
perpendicular to a handicap parking spot, while he got out of the car to pick 
up takeout.  Ms. Worsley remained in the vehicle.  While Ms. Worsley was 
waiting for Mr. Worsley to return, Jeffrey Mintiens’ (“Mr. Mintiens”) departed 
his parking space, and backed his truck into the back-passenger side door of 
Ms. Worsley’s vehicle. 
     On July 25, 2016, Ms. Worsley filed a complaint in the District Court of 
Maryland for Baltimore County against Mr. Mintiens alleging negligence and 
seeking compensation for the injuries she sustained as a result of the accident.  
At trial, Mr. Mintiens raised the defense of contributory negligence, and 
argued that Mr. Worsley had been negligent in failing to park his car in a 
parking space.  The district court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Mintiens, 
finding Mr. Worsley’s negligence in parking the vehicle in the travel lane had 
contributed to the accident.  The district court applied the doctrine of imputed 
negligence to attribute the negligence of Mr. Worsley onto Ms. Worsley, and 
thus, barred Ms. Worsley’s ability to seek relief for her injuries.  The Circuit 
Court for Baltimore County affirmed the ruling, finding the district court 
properly imputed Mr. Worsley’s negligence onto Ms. Worsley as the sole 
owner of the vehicle.  
     Ms. Worsley filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted.  Seaborne-Worsley, 458 Md. at 562, 183 A.3d 
at 145.  The issue before the court was whether the doctrine of imputed 
negligence should be applied to hold a sole owner-passenger vicariously liable 
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for the negligence of a permissive driver.  Id. at 562, 183 A.3d at 145.  The 
court began its analysis by examining the doctrine of imputed negligence in 
the context of automobile torts in Maryland.  Id. at 564, 183 A.3d at 146.  The 
court explained that the doctrine of imputed negligence applies when the sole 
owner of a vehicle is a passenger in their vehicle while a second party is 
driving.  Id.  The doctrine is based on the presumption that the owner is able 
to control the vehicle, or the owner has a right to exert control over the actions 
of the permissive driver.  Id.  Consequently, any negligence of the permissive 
driver is attributed to the owner-passenger.  Id.
      Next, the court examined the circumstances in which the negligence of a 
permissive driver would not be imputed onto the owner-passenger.  Seaborne-
Worsley, 458 Md. at 564, 183 A.3d at 146.  Generally, an owner-passenger has 
the burden of rebutting the presumption to escape the doctrine of imputed 
negligence.  Id. To rebut the presumption the owner must show they lacked 
operational control of the vehicle.  Id. (citing Williams v. Wheeler, 252 Md. 
75, 249 A.2d 104 (1969)).  The court explained that if the owner failed to rebut 
the presumption, the negligence of the permissive driver would be imputed 
onto the owner.  Id. at 564, 183 A.3d at 146.  Ultimately, the trial court found 
Ms. Worsley had failed to rebut the presumption.  Id. at 562, 183 A.3d at 144.  
     Next, the court analyzed how the changes in both law and automobile 
insurance policies have diminished the necessity of the doctrine.  Seaborne-
Worsley, 458 Md. at 569, 183 A.3d at 148.  Specifically, changes to insurance 
laws and coverage now protect drivers from other uninsured or underinsured 
motorists, allowing injured drivers to recover from drivers that are financially 
unfit to compensate for damages.  Id. at 569, 183 A.3d at 148-49.  Due to this 
evolution of law and automobile insurance, there is no longer a rationale for a 
presumption that an owner-passenger has control over a permissive driver.  Id.
at 569, 183 A.3d at 148. 
     Next, the court addressed the reality of how little control an owner-
passenger has over a vehicle.  Seaborne-Worsley, 458 Md. at 570, 183 A.3d at 
149.  The court emphasized the difference between the owner-passenger’s 
right to control and the owner-passenger’s actual ability to control the vehicle.  
Id.  The court noted how backseat driving is both a danger and an annoyance 
to a driver.  Id. (citing Slutter v. Homer, 244 Md. 131, 139, 223 A.2d 141 
(1966)).  Furthermore, if an owner-passenger were to attempt to exert physical 
control over the vehicle while the permissive driver was driving, it would 
likely be ineffective in preventing the driver from driving negligently.  
Seaborne-Worsley, at 570, 183 A.3d at 149. 
     Finally, the court analyzed the complexity of determining the sole owner 
of a vehicle. Seaborne-Worsley, 458 Md. at 570, 183 A.3d at 149.  The court 
acknowledged that in many families, formal title or registration of a vehicle 
has more to do with who finances the vehicle, but does not necessarily 
correlate to who exercises domain over the vehicle.  Seaborne-Worsley, at 570, 
183 A.3d at 149 (citing Green v. Green, 64 Md. App. 122, 144, 494 A.2d 721 
(1985)). Additionally, the court explained that co-owner-passengers are 
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exempt from the doctrine of imputed negligence as they cannot possess actual 
and superior rights to control the vehicle.  Id. at 572, 183 A.3d at 150 (citing 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stroh, 314 Md. 176, 550 A,3d 373 (1988)).  The 
difficulty of determining an owner of a vehicle makes proper application of 
the doctrine of imputed negligence problematic.  Seaborne-Worsley, at 570, 
183 A.3d at 149. 
     In Seaborne-Worsley, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held the doctrine 
of imputed negligence did not apply as the court no longer presumes that an 
owner-passenger has operational control over a permissive driver. The court 
eliminated the contributory negligence presumption regarding owner-
passengers in Maryland, finding the policy behind the presumption of owner 
control to be fictitious, as passengers do not always have actual control over 
permissive drivers. This case allows for negligent drivers to be held 
accountable for their actions and provides innocent owner-passengers the 
ability to obtain damages without having to first rebut the presumption.  By 
eliminating the presumption, courts will likely be required to analyze the 
specific facts of each case before determining whether the doctrine of imputed 
negligence will hold owner-passengers negligent.  Additionally, the court’s 
willingness to eliminate the presumption may also indicate that Maryland 
could be taking small steps towards eventually transitioning to a comparative 
negligence jurisdiction.  
             
